Abstract: In this study, we use data on intra-day transactions to analyze whether REIT liquidity as measured by the bid-ask spread changed from 1990 to 1994, a period during which the industrys market capitalization increased from $9 billion to $45 billion. We find that REIT spreads narrowed significantly. We then use a variation of the empirical model proposed by Stoll (1978) to analyze the determinants of percentage spreads including whether spreads are determined by return variability, share price, exchange listing, and asset type. We find strong support for Stolls model, in that return variance and share price are the primary determinants of percentage spreads in both periods analyzed. This suggests that the liquidity of REIT securities is similar to that of non-REIT securities with similar prices and return variance. In addition, we find that percentage spreads are wider for REITs trading on NASDAQ. In contrast with an earlier study, we find that market capitalization is not a significant determinant of REIT percentage spreads.
Introduction
From 1990-94, the market capitalization of all tax-qualified real estate investment trusts (REITs) increased from $8.7 billion to $44.3 billion, an increase of more than 500%.
The industry effectively doubled in size from 1990-92 (from $8.7 billion to $15.7 billion) and then doubled again during 1993 (to $32.1 billion). Much of this explosive growth is attributable to the switch from private to public ownership of commercial real estate following the industry bust in the late 1980s. The switch from private to public ownership has been fueled in large part by the growing involvement of institutional investors seeking a more liquid vehicle for diversifying into commercial real estate. These investors, who were unable to liquidate their holdings in commingled real estate funds in a timely manner when the commercial real estate market tanked in the late 1980s, view REITs as a less risky vehicle for incorporating commercial real estate into their predominantly stock and bond portfolios.
The claim that REITs offer greater liquidity than other real estate investment vehicles has not gone unchallenged. Many practitioners and academics argue that REITs are much less liquid than proponents claim, pointing out that the market capitalization of most REITs is small enough that the typical-sized trade of an institutional investor could significantly affect transaction prices. Indeed, if multiple large investors were to attempt to sell their shares in response to a cyclical downswing, or simply as a sunspot response, they would only be able to do so at firesale prices. This paper contributes to this debate by examining the changes in REIT liquidity during the 1990s. The measure of liquidity adopted here is the difference between a security's bid and ask prices, or the bid-ask spread. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) state ªIlliquidity can be measured by the cost of immediate execution.º They go on to say ªa -2-It should be kept in mind that bid-ask spreads are only one measure of liquidity. In 1 particular, bid-ask spreads can be poor measure of liquidity if one desires immediacy for large positions. See Bhasin (1996) for a discussion of the shortcomings of bid-ask spread and for an alternative measure of liquidity.
In contrast, Below, Kiely, and McIntosh (1995) find that during 1991 spreads on equity 2 REITs were significantly wider than those on similar non-REIT stocks.
natural measure of illiquidity is the spread between the bid and ask prices.º Hence, larger bid-ask spreads are widely regarded as evidence of more illiquid securities. Demsetz (1968) was the first to analyze bid-ask spreads empirically, and numerous researchers have followed his pathbreaking work.
1 Nelling et al. (1995) provide some evidence on the liquidity of REITs as measured by the bid-ask spread. They show that during 1990 REIT bid-ask spreads are similar to the spreads on equities of similar size. Somewhat disconcertingly (for the REIT industry), they 2 also document reductions in REIT liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads over the period. However, that period predates the explosive growth in the REIT market during 1990-94, suggesting that a reexamination of REIT liquidity is in order. We hypothesize that this growth was accompanied by increases in REIT liquidity in part because of the entry in to the market of large institutional investors. Consequently, we examine changes in REIT liquidity as measured by the bid-ask spreads of all publicly traded REITs from 1990 to 1994.
One reason for an increased participation in the REIT market by institutional investors is that larger market capitalization REIT's became available, thereby offering instituitonal investors with the opportunity to purchase meaningful chunks of commercial real estate.
Another reason is that the "five or fewer" restriction which states that no more than 50% of a REITs stock could be held by five or fewer investors has essentially been relaxed. New -3-See, for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Easley and OHara (1987) , and Kyle 3 (1985) .
The 1992 edition was used to identify REITs in existence as of year-end 1990, and the 4 1995 edition was used to identify REITs in existence as of year-end 1994. The 1992 edition was used because there was no 1991 edition. The 1992 edition identifies REITs that began trading after year-end 1990 and provides year-end 1990 data on invested assets and market capitalization.
The REIT Handbook also identifies ªother over-the-counter stocks,º but we chose to limit 5 our analysis to stocks trading on the NYSE, the AMEX, or NASDAQ exchanges. legislation in 1993 directed the IRS to ªlook throughº a large pension investor to the number of individual pension fund participants when applying the rule, thereby opening the door to increased institutional investment in REITs.
As the interest of institutional investors in REITs has increased, so has the interest of investment firms covering the REIT industry. With more investment firms covering each REIT, informational asymmetries between uninformed and informed traders should be reduced. Since informational asymmetries impose adverse selection costs on the market makers, and are recovered through the bid-ask spreads, a reduction in informational asymmetries, should cause the bid-ask spreads to decrease. REITs holding at least 75% of invested assets in the form of equity is classified as an equity REIT, whereas a REIT holding at lest 75% of invested assets in the form of mortgages if classified as a mortgage REIT. All other REITs are classified as hybrid REITs.
samples of 117 and 223 REITs for 1990 and 1994, respectively. The information in the REIT Handbook was used to identify the exchange on which each REIT traded; whether a REIT was classified as an equity, mortgage, or hybrid REIT; as well as the year-end market capitalization.
6 Table 1 shows the numbers and market capitalization of the two sample years by asset type and exchange. During 1990, 44% of the 117 tax-qualified REITs traded on the NYSE, while 34% traded on the AMEX. The remaining 14% traded on the NASDAQ. Market capitalization was clearly skewed toward the NYSE, which accounted for 74% of the $8.7 billion industry total, while the NASDAQ accounted for only 9%. By asset type, almost half of the 117 REITs were classified as equity specialists, just over a third as mortgage specialists, and the remainder as hybrids. Market capitalization was similarly distributed.
During 1994, more than 60% of the 223 tax-qualified REITs traded on the NYSE, and these REITs accounted for more than 90% of the industry capitalization. Only 11% of REITs traded on NASDAQ, and these 24 firms accounted for but 3% of the industrys $44.6 billion market capitalization. By asset type, four of five REITs were classified as equity specialists.
These 178 firms also accounted for 88% of the industrys market capitalization. Thus, the bulk of the growth in the REIT industry was accounted for by equity REITs.
Next, our initial samples of firms were cross-referenced with lists of firms from the Institute for the Study of Securities Market (ISSM) 1990 transaction file and from the Trading -5-The 1990 ISSM tapes contained no transaction price data for three sample securities: 7 CEDR, CMRT, and PDLA. Consequently, these three firms were excluded from the remainder of our analysis. Since in aggregate these three firms accounted for only $23 million in market capitalization, we expect their exclusion has negligible effect on our results. and Quotes (TAQ) 1994 transaction file. We were able to obtain data necessary to calculate bid-ask spreads for all but three of the firms in our initial samples. The 1990 and 1994 7 transaction files were also used to obtain data necessary to calculate daily averages for price and volume.
Two alternative measures of the bid-ask spread were calculated: a dollar spread and a percentage spread. The dollar spread is the daily average dollar spread, while the percentage spread is the dollar spread divided by the daily average share price. We use daily averages because Harris (1989) has shown that the last transaction of the day tends to occur at the asking price which can bias the results. The daily spread measurement for the firm is then averaged over all trading days in each year. Table 2 presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics for our two sample years. In this table, we see that the average daily return variance fell from 18% in 1990 to 7% in 1994, a decline of more than 60%. Average daily volume almost tripled from 11 thousand shares in 1990 to more than 30 thousand shares in 1994. Average daily turnover (dollar volume divided by market capitalization) increased from 0.19% to 0.27%. Average share price increased from $9 to $15 and market value increased from $74 million to $200 million.
Shares outstanding (not shown) increased from 11 million to only 12.6 million, implying that most of the increase in market value was due to increases share prices. (Differences in the -6-distributions of REITs across exchanges and asset types were explored in the discussion in Panel A shows that the overall decline in percentage spreads is largely attributable to the spreads of NASDAQ REITs, which declined 3.94 percentage points from 11.64% to 7.
70%. Spreads on NYSE REITs declined 0.45 percentage points from 3.88% to 3.43%, while spreads on AMEX REITs increased by 0.44 percentage points from 4.43% to 4.87%. All of these differences are statistically significant. Panel B shows that this decline has not been uniform across asset types. Indeed, it is attributable almost entirely to the decline in the spreads of equity REITs, which fell 1.02 percentage points from 4.49% to 3.47%. Spreads on mortgage REITs actually increased over this time period from 6.02% to 6.95%, while spreads of hybrid REITs declined only 0.05 percentage points from 8.61%. The decline in equity REIT spreads and the increase in the mortgage REIT spreads were highly significant, while the change in the hybrid REIT spreads was insignificant.
-7-
The measures assume that the shares of REITs are infinitely divisible, i.e., the investor can 8 buy or sell fractional shares. This assumption is without loss of generality. Under an alternative assumption, eq. (2) and eq. (5) below measure the transaction costs that should be allocated for each $100 invested in REIT index mutual funds which replicate the (hypothetical) equally weighted and value-weighted REIT indices.
To investigate whether the declines in percentage spreads over the 1990-1994 period were driven by declines in the numerator (the dollar-value spread), the denominator (share price), or both, Table 4 presents average dollar-value spreads instead of percentage spreads.
As shown at the top of Table 4 , the average dollar spread actually widened from 30 cents to 35 cents during the 1990-1994 period, a 5 cent difference that is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Panel A shows that dollar spreads increased for all three asset types, but only the increase for mortgage REITs (from 23 cents to 31 cents) is statistically significant. Panel B
shows that dollar spreads increased for both NYSE and AMEX REITs, but declined for NASDAQ REITs. Only the NYSE increase (from 24 cents to 35 cents), however, is statistically significant. As a whole, the results in Table 4 show that REIT dollar spreads were constant or increasing during the 1990-1994 period. Therefore, the declines in the percentage spreads observed in Table 3 must be attributed to increases in share prices rather than to declines in dollar spreads. Tables 3 and 4 It is important to note that the equally weighted portfolio spread shown above is not the same as the average percentage spread presented in Table 3 . The average percentage spread is calculated as:
While the results in
As shown in Table 5 , for all REITs the equally weighted portfolio spreads declined during the 1990-1994 period by 93 cents from $3.29 per $100 to $2.36 per $100. Hence, transaction costs fell by more than 28%, strong evidence of increased liquidity in the REIT market.
Panel A presents portfolio spreads by exchange. As shown in this panel, the spread on an equally weighted NYSE REIT portfolio declined from $2.18 per $100 to $1.96 per $100 or about 10%. The spread on an equally weighted NASDAQ REIT portfolio declined from $8.08 per $100 to $5.54 per $100 or more than 30%. The spread on an equally weighted AMEX REIT portfolio was up slightly but essentially unchanged.
As shown in panel B, the decline in spreads by asset type was confined to equity and hybrid REITs. For an equally weighted equity REIT portfolio, the spread declined from $2.88 per $100 to $2.19 per $100, a decline of 24%. For an equally weighted hybrid REIT portfolio, the spread declined from $5.14 per $100 to $3.35 per $100, a decline of almost half. In contrast, the spread for an equally weighted mortgage REIT portfolio actually increased slightly from $3.57 per $100 to $3.70 per $100. Table 5 are the spread costs incurred while constructing a value-weighted REIT portfolio with a market value of $100. The dollar spread paid for the value-weighted portfolio is:
Also in
where Value weighted portfolio spread is the dollar spread that would be paid by construction a portfolio with a market value of $100 allocated proportionally by the market capitalization across all REITs trading in each group in a given year, Spread is the quoted dollar bid-ask i spread averaged over all quotes in the year for stock i, and Shares is the number of shares of i stock i in the portfolio. The number of shares of each stock in a value-weighted portfolio is calculated as
The number of shares of each stock in the portfolio is the dollar investment in each stock in the portfolio divided by each stocks price. The dollar investment in each stock is 100 times the market value fraction, which is the ratio of the stocks market capitalization to that of the group. Inserting eq. (5) into eq. (4) and rearranging terms, we obtain:
From eq. (6), we see that the value-weighted percentage portfolio spread is equal to the valueweighted individual stock percentage spread.
For all REITs, the value-weighted percentage spread declined from 1.97% in 1990 to 1.89% in 1994. Panel A shows that from 1990 to 1994, the value-weighted percentage spreads declined only modestly for NYSE listed REITs, increased by 63 basis points for AMEX -11-REITs, and declined by 216 basis points for hybrid REITs. Panel B shows a similar pattern in value-weighted percentage spreads by REIT type. These spreads declined slightly for equity REITs, increased by 81 basis points for mortgage REITs, and declined by 294 basis points for hybrid REITs.
These results suggest that increases in REIT liquidity were most pronounced for hybrid REITs and for REITs trading on NASDAQ.
To summarize, we find that average percentage spreads declined significantly from 1990 to 1994, and that these declines were driven by changes in share prices rather than changes in dollar spreads. In a portfolio context, we find that the dollar spreads on $100
equally weighted and value-weighted REIT portfolios declined overall, for equity and hybrid but not mortgage REITs, and for NYSE and NASD but not AMEX REITs. This evidence suggests that the overall liquidity of REITs increased during this period, but that this increased liquidity was not uniform across asset type or exchange listing.
Regression methodology
Next, we use ordinary-least-squares regressions to explain determinants of the bid-ask spread for the 1990 and 1994 samples and to test whether the observed cross-sectional relationship are stable across the two time periods. We follow Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) in using the empirical work of Stoll (1978) as the basis for our model of the spread.
Bid-ask spreads compensate market makers for the costs incurred while providing inter-temporal liquidity to prospective buyers and sellers. Market makers incur fixed, inventory and adverse information costs during trading. Fixed costs include back office and paper work costs. Inventory costs are incurred when market makers buy or sell from personal -12-Note that due to their role as providers of liquidity, dealers are limited in their ability to 9 diversify their positions.
The predicted sign on return variability due to adverse information is the same as that due 10 to the holding cost component -if there exists an investor with an informational advantage, the advantage would increase with the variability of the asset for which he has the information, e.g. Kyle (1985) .
inventory and bear the risk of random price changes. Adverse selection costs exist because market makers are unable to distinguish between informed and un-informed investors.
Positive spreads allow the market makers to recover losses due to trading with informed traders from uninformed traders.
In (1995) report that market capitalization is the primary determinant of REIT bid-ask spreads. Both studies report a negative relationship between market value and spreads so we also expect a negative relationship. Second, we include two dummy variables indicating whether a stock trades on the AMEX or NASDAQ exchanges as opposed to the NYSE. Kadlec and McConnell (1994) have documented that a listing on the NYSE reduces spreads.
We expect each of these to be positive. Finally, we include two dummy variables for REIT asset type (mortgage and hybrid) to test whether spreads on these types of REITs are different from spreads on equity REITs. Nelling et al. (1995) report significantly lower spreads for equity REITs, so we expect our dummies for mortgage and hybrid REITs to be positive. Our full model specification is: 
where Spread is the average percentage bid-ask spread for firm i in year t; Return Variance is a dummy variable indicating that stock i trades on the NASDAQ exchange in year t;
Mortgage is a dummy variable indicating that stock i was a mortgage REIT in year t; and
Hybrid is a dummy variable indicating that stock i was a hybrid REIT in year t. Given this i,t specification, dummy variables measure spread differences relative to an equity REIT trading on the NYSE. To gain efficiency, we pool the 1990 and 1994 samples using a full set of dummy interaction terms for both 1990 and 1994. Pooling also enables us to test whether each variables coefficients for 1990 and 1994 are different.
12
This methodology enables us to test whether the differences in 1990 and 1994 spreads reported in Table 3 are (1) due to changes in the independent variables over the same period, -15-(2) due to changes in the underlying relationship between spreads and the independent variable, or (3) due to other unexplained factors. If spread differences are attributable to changes in the variables, then we should observe differences across years in the variable means but not in the parameter estimates of those variables. Changes in the underlying relationship between spreads and the explanatory variables would show up as differences across years in the parameter estimates for a given variable. Finally, differences in spreads due to unexplained factors would show up as differences in the intercepts for the two years.
The results of this analysis provide insights into the factors to which the observed differences in 1990 and 1994 spreads can be attributed. This has important implications for institutional investors seeking a more liquid vehicle for including commercial real estate assets in their portfolios.
Univariate regression results
First, we perform separate univariate regressions to analyze the effect of the explanatory variables on percentage spreads in each of these two years. Because an analysis of the raw data suggested that non-linearities were present in the data, specification (7) was also tested on logarithmic transforms of the variables. Tables 6 and 7 contain the results for the transformed and the non-transformed variables.
For the non-transformed data, parameter estimates and the associated t-statistics for 1990 appear in the third column of Parameter estimates and their associated t-statistics for 1994 appear in column 6 of Table 6 . Each variable statistically significant in explaining 1990 spreads also is significant in explaining 1994 spreads and has the same sign. In addition, turnover is negative and significant while the mortgage dummy is positive and significant. Coefficients generally are smaller and have larger t-statistics, but this may be attributable to the approximate doubling of sample size from 1990 to 1994. share price, and market capitalization. In general, the results are in keeping with those presented in Table 6 with one important exception. The logarithmic transformations greatly -17-
The dummy for hybrid REITs is significant at the 0.05 level, but regression diagnostics 13 reveal that variable is unduly influenced by a single observation (CMETS).
increase the explanatory power of return variance, price, and market value. The adjusted-R 2 for return variance rises from 0.63 in Table 6 to 0.78 in Table 7 , indicating that this risk measure explains more than three-fourths of the variability in log percentage spreads. For share price, the adjusted-R rises from 0.25 in Table 6 to 0.69 in Table 7 , and, for market 2 capitalization, from 0.10 to 0.59.
Multivariate regression results
Next, we perform multivariate regressions on the pooled data to test whether the relationships observed in Tables 6 and 7 Results based upon the non-transformed 1994 data appear in column 3 of Table 8 .
These results show that only three of our explanatory variablesÐreturn variance, share price, and the AMEX dummyÐare significant at least at the 0. indicates that spreads of AMEX stocks were 223 basis points narrower than those of stocks trading on the NYSE or NASDAQ.
The last column of dominates market value in explaining percentage spreads, and the correlation between these two variables is very high, the significance of market value in earlier work can be attributed to model mis-specification, i.e., the omission of share price.
14 The results for 1994, which appear in column 3, show the same three variables significant in explaining 1990 spreads are statistically significant in explaining 1994 spreads, again with the expected signs. In addition, the AMEX dummy is negative and significant, indicating that spreads on AMEX stocks were significantly lower during 1994 than spreads on other stocks. In the last column of Table 9 are test statistics from a t-test for differences in the 1990 and 1994 coefficients. These statistics indicate that only the AMEX coefficient is significantly different in 1990 and 1994. This stability of coefficients over the time period is strong evidence that the decline in spreads documented in Table 3 are attributable to changes in the values of the explanatory variables rather than to a fundamental change in the underlying relationship between spreads and the explanatory variables or than to unexplained factors. Indeed, with an adjusted R of 0.89, there is very little variation in spreads left to 2 explain. A check of Table 2 provides added support for this conclusion. Looking at the three variables significant in both periods, we see that the average return variance dropped from -20-18% to 7%, average share price rose from $9 to $15, and the percentage of firms trading on the NASDAQ declined from 20% to 11%.
In summary, our analysis of the determinants of bid-ask spreads shows that a variation of the empirical model proposed by Stoll (1978) explains almost 90% of the variability in spreads, that this model is stable over time, and that the primary determinants are the variance of daily returns, share price, and exchange listing. These results are largely consistent with other studies in the finance literature that have analyzed the percentage spreads of non-REIT stocks, and suggest that there is nothing ªdifferentº about the determinants of REIT liquidity.
Also, our findings contradict the earlier claims of Nelling et al. that market capitalization is the primary determinants of 1990 REIT bid-ask spreads, and that 1990 spreads were lower for equity REITs. We attribute this to the possibility that market value proxies for share price in their model.
Conclusions
In this study, we examine the bid-ask spreads of REITs for evidence whether the liquidity of REITs increased over the 1990-94 period. This was an important period for the REIT industry, during which the industrys market capitalization quintupled. Our analysis shows that REIT liquidity increased significantly from 1990 to 1994. Our findings have important implications for institutional and other investors as they seek more liquid vehicles for diversifying into commercial real estate. First, our results show that the costs of acquiring or liquidating commercial real estate holdings in the form of REIT equity securities have fallen as the size of the REIT market has grown. Second, we show that the primary -21-determinants of REIT spreads are risk (as measured by the variance of daily stock returns), share price, and exchange listing. Greater variance gives rise to wider spreads, while higher share prices give rise to lower spreads.
REITs listed on NASDAQ have wider spreads than those listed on the NYSE and AMEX. In general, we find that the determinants of bid-ask spreads were stable from 1990
to 1994, with one notable exception. In the latter period, REITs listed on AMEX were significantly lower than those listed on NYSE.
While this study provides evidence on changes in REIT liquidity, it leaves much room for future research in this area. First would be to determine why the return variance of REITs declined so precipitously from 1990 to 1994. We speculate that stabilization of the market for commercial real estate assets is largely responsible. During 1990, the commercial real estate market was in free fall with few properties transacting. The Resolution Trust
Corporation was just gearing up and had yet to begin disposing of the remnants of the battered thrift industry. These factors created tremendous uncertainty about real estate asset value, which translated into greater variance of returns on those assets. By 1994, commercial real estate markets were well on the road to recovery, with numerous transactions reducing uncertainty about asset values, hence reducing the variance of return on those assets.
A second promising area of future research would be to test whether the determinants of REIT spreads and the variance of REIT returns are different from the determinants of spreads or return variance for typical stocks. It may well be true that spreads and the return variance for similar non-REIT stocks also declined from 1990 to 1994. The data processing requirements for testing this hypothesis are formidable, however.
-22-A third promising area of future research would be to investigate the role of inside and outside block ownership in determining REIT spreads. Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) report a positive effect of insider holdings on dealer information costs but no effect for institutional holdings based upon a sample of 63 NYSE firms. It seems likely that an analysis of REITs would provide similar results. We leave these areas as promising paths for future research. Table 1 Number Note: The equally weighted spread is the dollar spread that would be paid to construct a portfolio with a market value of $100 containing an equal number of shares of each REIT trading in each group in a given year. The number of shares of each stock in an equally weighted portfolio is 100 divided by the sum of all REIT prices in the group. A stocks contribution to the portfolio dollar spread is the stocks dollar spread multiplied by the number of shares. These contributions are summed across all REITs in each group to obtain the equally weighted dollar spread. The value-weighted spread is the dollar spread that would be paid to construct a portfolio with a market value of $100 allocated proportionally by the market capitalization across all REIT trading in each group in a given year. The number of shares of each stock in a value-weighted portfolio is 100 times the ratio of the stocks market capitalization to that of the group (to obtain the dollar investment per stock) and then dividing by the stocks price. A stocks contribution to the portfolio dollar spread is the stocks dollar spread multiplied by the number of shares. These contributions are summed across all REITs in each group in each year to obtain the value-weighted dollar spread.
-29- Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
**
Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
* -32- Table 9 Determinants of REIT bid-ask spreads Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
*
